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TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Trade Liberalization: Savior or Scourge of SADC Economies?
Ben Chigara*
Introduction
The might of global trade forces reined against developing
countries individually and collectively are well documented. In its 2001
Report on Trade and Development, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) wrote:
Given the difficulties that developing countries have been facing in
finding unilateral solutions to the problem of managing their
currencies and preventing financial crises, and given the resistance
of the major powers to genuine reform of the international financial
architecture, attention has increasingly focused on regional
solutions. In this context, there is growing interest in the lessons
provided by the European experience with regional monetary
cooperation and currency arrangements in the post-Bretton Woods
era, which culminated in a monetary union at the end of the 1990s.1
The difficulties faced by developing countries in the current
international economic and trade climate remind one of the story of the
colony of mice that shared a crop yard and its adjacent compound of
granaries with a cat. Concerned about what appeared to be the cat's
eternal control over their welfare, the mice gathered to determine what to
do with the cat; much like the Organization of African Unity has been
gathering since its foundation in 1963 to determine local and global
issues that affect the region. Given that the mice could not eliminate the
cat whatsoever, the mice decided that the solution to their problem lay in
tying round the cat's neck a belt of jingles. This would significantly
reduce the chances that a mouse would find itself stuck between the cat's
paws. Excitement at having found a way of taming the cat soon gave way
to gloom when the question was asked: whom among them would place
the belt of jingles round the cat's neck? That sent home the chilling fact
that evolution's trickery had privileged, perhaps permanently, the cat's
fortunes over those of the mouse whenever the pair found themselves in
a situation of competition-with the cat dominating the mouse and the
mouse having to cope with the limits imposed upon it by the cat's
domination. It also concluded the meeting of the colony of mice. Among
States, similar evolutionary trickery appears to have privileged the
* (BA); (LL.M); (Ph.D.); Lecturer - School of Law, University of Warwick, United Kingdom. I am
grateful to Barnabas Chigara (B.C.) who assisted in the research of this article. The views expressed
and any mistakes are attributable to myself alone.
I U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT at
118, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR.2001, U.N. Sales No. E.00.II.D:10 (2001),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr0lch5.en.pdf.
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fortunes of developed countries over those of developing and least
developed countries, particularly when States compete for allocation of
scarce resources and markets in which to trade their goods.
The disparate economic forces and sectors that now dominate
international trade date back thousands of years for most developed
countries, and only a few hundred years or even less for most developing
and least developed countries. Nonetheless, the recently formed World
Trade Organization (WTO), which is both a discontinuation and
continuation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2, is
portrayed by its protagonists as the virtuous "Solomon" of old set to even
out the case between the cat and the terrified mice so that the cat never
has to have nightmares of waking up to find a belt of jingles tied round
its neck and the mice never have to worry when they order their welfare
in the crop yard and the granaries adjacent to it. This article examines the
impact of trade liberalization on Southern African Development
Community (SADC) 3 economies. This article shows that optimism in the
WTO as guarantor of developing countries' fortunes in international
trade (inspired by what Gallagher calls the WTO's concept of balance
and fairness between the organization's poorest and richest countries 4) is
illusory for most SADC Member States. The reason for this is because
developing countries' aspirations to create supranational organizations,
that like the European Union are capable of empowering them for
meaningful engagement with the rest of the world, are always at the
mercy of developed countries' economic interests. The psychology of
dominance and subservience resides at the core of decisions attributable
to both extreme affluence and abject poverty in the international
community. Even the noble proclamation of the WTO seeking to
predicate international trade on the principles of fairness and balance has
2 See CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENTS: GLOBALIZING
LAW THROUGH SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 12 (Cambridge University Press 2000).
3 Treaty Establishing the Southern Africa Development Community, August 17, 1992, Angl.-Bots.-
Lesotho-Malawa-Mozam.-Namib.-Swaz.-Tanz.-Zambia-Zimb., 32 I.L.M. 116 (1993).
4 PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Kluwer Law Int'l 2000).
5 The European Union's strategy of overcoming its previous reliance on the Bretton Woods financial
arrangements as a first step to economic independence is often cited as a good example for
developing countries. UNCTAD's analysis of the function of viable and appropriate exchange rate
regimes in establishing enduring markets in developing economies writes that "... the post-Bretton
Woods experience of Europe in establishing mechanisms to achieve a stable pattern ofintra-regional
exchange rates, and eventually move to a currency union, may hold useful lessons for developing
regions, particularly East Asia and South America." U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
supra note 2, at 110. But what is often not mentioned in similar reports is the fact that the EU had
enormous financial support of the U.S. which had an interest in the success of the EC project. See
also D. LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 6-7 (6th ed. Butterworths 1994).
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done little to affect that psychology. This article argues, that in order to
uphold that principle, the WTO needs to substitute among Member
States the psychology of constructive mutual cooperation for the
psychology of dominance and subjugation, by instituting both
substantive and procedural measures targeted at ensuring that developing
countries' aspirations to create supranational organizations are not
compromised by developed countries' efforts to preserve the status quo.
I. Regional Coordination as a Mechanism for
Internationalization
Internationalization through regional cooperation has in recent
years become the principal model of pursuing States' concerns. Regional
cooperation has superseded multilateral cooperation in matters of human
rights protection, national defense, and security and economic
arrangements. The internationalization of markets through regional
economic cooperation and economic integration under the right
circumstances is perceived as a very effective way of stimulating
sustained growth of national economies. 6 This model has become the
subject of much study in recent years as regional groups across the world
embrace it.7 Both developing and developed countries are entering into
regional agreements seeking to harmonize national development policies
for the sake of enhancing their economic growth and competitiveness in
a world that increasingly regards globalization as a matter of fact and
inevitability. Some of these groups are characterized by diverse
heterogeneous economies, while others in comparison, are relatively
homogeneous. All this activity points, perhaps to the overwhelming
belief by States in the utility of internationalization through
rationalization. The SADC, successor to the Southern African
Coordination Conference (SADCC) 8 is one such regional arrangement.
6 See F.A.S.T. MATAMBALYA, THE IMPACT OF REGIONALISATION SCHEMES ON THE EXPORT AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 30 (Brandes and Aspel 1995).
7 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, World Development Report 1996:
FROM PLAN TO MARKET (Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
8 Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, supra note 3, at 116.
Established in 1980 as a forum for economic liberation and reducing economic dependence on
apartheid South Africa and to pursue policies aimed at the economic integration of their economies.
The original nine member States-Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe-were inspired by four strategic goals, namely, to reduce
dependence of the region on the outside world, and in particular on South Africa, to promote
collective self-reliance of the member countries, to promote and co-ordinate economic co-operation
through a project and sector-led approach, and to provide joint action to secure international
understanding of, and practical support for, the SADC strategy.
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Established by the treaty of August 17, 1999 signed at Windhoek
by the heads of States of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe at
the 12t summit of the SADCC the SADC has a membership of 14.
Namibia became the tenth Member State after its independence in 1990.
Following the holding of democratic elections in South Africa in April
1994, South Africa became the eleventh member State of the SADC in
August 1994. Subsequently, Mauritius, Seychelles, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo have also become members. The organization seeks
to accelerate economic growth of the region, to improve the living
conditions of its citizens through regional cooperation in different fields,
and to harmonize economic development of the region.9 Article 5(1) of
the treaty establishing the SADC 10 lists the objectives of the organization
to be:
a) pursuit of development and economic growth, alleviation of
poverty, enhancement of the standard and quality of life of its
citizens and the support of the socially disadvantaged through
regional integration;
b) evolution of common political values, systems and institutions;
c) promotion and defense of peace and security;
d) promotion of self-sustaining development on the basis of
collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of member
States;
e) pursuit of complementarity between national and regional
strategies and programs;
f) pursuit and maximization of productive employment and
utilization of regional resources;
g) pursuit of sustainable use of natural resources and the effective
protection of the environment; and
h) strengthening and consolidation of longstanding historical, social
and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region;
Article 5(2)11 states that in order to achieve the objectives set out in
Article 5(1), the SADC shall:
a) harmonize political and socio-economic policies and plans of
Members States;
b) encourage the peoples of the region and their institutions to take
initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across
the region and to participate fully in the implementation of
programs and projects of the organization;
9 See The Lusaka Declaration, 1 April 1980: "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation."




c) create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the
mobilization of requisite resources for the implementation of
programs and operations of the organization and its institutions;
d) develop policies aimed at progressive elimination of obstacles to
the free movement of capital and labor, goods and services, and
of the peoples of the region generally among member States;
e) promote the development of human resources;
f) promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology;
g) improve economic management and performance through
regional cooperation;
h) promote the coordination and harmonization of the international
relations of Member States;
i) secure international understanding, cooperation and support, and
mobilize the inflow of public and private resources into the
region; and
j) develop such other activities as member States may decide in the
furtherance of the objectives of this treaty.
The SADC's shield and nurture approach to economic and trade
development prioritizes intra-trade cooperation. This is consistent with
the organization's ultimate goal of progressively harmonizing Member
States' microeconomic policies towards establishing, incrementally, a
free trade zone, a customs union and ultimately full economic union with
integrated monetary and fiscal systems and a regional parliament by the
year 2034. In its 2001 Trade and Development Report, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) highlights
this strategy as a crucial step in any effort by States to break away from
dependence on the Bretton Woods system. 12 But the privileging of intra-
trade cooperation over inter-trade cooperation may not be consistent with
WTO norms of national treatment (NT) and most favored nation status
(MFN) to which Member States of the SADC have pledged themselves
to by signing the WTO agreements of 1994. This highlights problems
created when States simultaneously embrace disjointed trade
mechanisms that are evolving contemporaneously when those
mechanisms require States Parties to commit themselves to divergent or
even conflicting norms. There is nothing novel about the SADC's
ultimate goal of wanting to achieve full economic union by 2034. Neither
is there anything uncommon about its strategy for getting there. Other
regional organizations including the European Union (EU), the North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and the Association of East Asian
Nations are very much ahead of the SADC in that effort. In fact, those
that have made more progress are able to penetrate, with frustrating
consequences, the shield in the SADC strategy to achieve an African
12 See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT supra note 2, at 118.
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Economic Community by 2034.13 This raises the question on the
reliability of claims, that trade liberalization premised on the concept of
balance and fairness is possible for Member States of the WTO who vary
from the poorest to the richest countries.1 4 The latter do not appear to
want to relinquish their Revealed Comparative Advantage15 (RCA).
Rather, they appear keen to secure and to maximize the status quo.
II. The Dynamics of Market Liberalism
Trade liberalization, or opening up of national markets
advocated by the WTO, is not a new phenomenon. The economic
integration that we call globalization is only the latest stage or example
of what has been happening for ages. Calitz writes, that, "If one adopts a
long-term perspective, modern economic globalization may be viewed as
the latest manifestation of an erratic pattern of economic integration
which has occurred in leaps and bounds over the years. 16 In Roman
times, when the Dinarius was used as a currency in an area which today
covers parts of more than 40 countries in Europe, North Africa, and Asia,
monetary integration was far more advanced than in modern Europe.
More recently, from 1870 to 1930, the pound sterling was the currency of
a part of the world, which today represents more than 50 countries
(including India which has a population of one billion-almost one
quarter of the world population). The difference between modern day
economic globalization and previous versions of it is that:
1) it appears not to be driven by an imperial power though the role
and function of the United Nations' financial institutions
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank is difficult to exonerate from imperial force machinations;
2) it does not require a military offensive aimed at a stable
expansion of territory;
3) "the major agent of economic integration is a spectacular drop in
the cost of communications and information .... Global
communication at falling cost presents competition to
13 See generally 0. Akinkugbe, The European Union-South Africa Free Trade Agreements and the
SADC Region, 68 No.4 THE S. AFR. J. OF ECON., 639 (2000) (discussing the European Union's
departure from its practice of entering trade agreements with regional blocks to selecting the strong
players in developing countries' regional economic pacts to the detriment of regional groupings).
14 See Gallagher, supra note 4.
15 For a discussion of recent applications of this economic indicator developed by Balasa in 1965,
See generally N. Valentine & G. Krasnik, SADC Trade With the Rest of the World: Winning Export
Sectors and Revealed Comparative Advantage Ratios, 68 No. 2 THE S. AFR. J. OF ECON.., 266
(2000).
16 E. Calitz, Fiscal Implications of the Economic Globalisation of South Africa, 68 No.4 THE S.
AFR. J. OF ECON., 564, 565 (2000).
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governments because it influences the views and behavior of
residents and reduces the scope for authoritarianism, paternalism
and government without accountability""T;
4) it occurs at an unparalleled scale, attracting participation of State
entities, multinational companies, financial institutions, residents
and foreigners of States, international mobility of capital,
technology and sometimes labor;
5) it produces devastating effects, winners and losers, affluence and
abject poverty;
6) it compounds labor migration, in that an estimated 120 million
people find themselves outside their countries of birth, a high
proportion even if we discount political refugees; and
7) it is perceived by many to be irreversible. 8
Justifications for trade liberalization appears, in one sense, to enjoin
themselves to liberal and utilitarian values. Often it is seen as:
1) cutting protection and reducing tariff levels leads to
maximization of national production and export comparative
advantage;
2) accelerating integration of economies throughout the world
through trade, financial flows, the exchange of technology,
information and ideas and the movement of people;
3) essential for the generation of export-led growth;19
4) necessary for the improving allocative efficiency and facilitatory
of specialist production and increase in exports that enable
greater imports and consumption 20 ; and
5) facilitatory of dynamic gains such as increased diffusion of
knowledge and technology, increased competition, more
production in sectors with higher income and price elasticities,
and increased investment.21
This argument is based in large measure on what Roberts calls
the orthodox trade theory and its assumptions of perfect competition,
constant or decreasing returns to scale, no externalities... etc.22 Research,
however, shows that although positive associations have been found
between export and growth in the reforming States, the relationship with
liberalization is uncertain. The World Bank in 1989 found from
17 Id. at 566.
18 Id. at 568.
19 See Republic of South Africa, Growth, Employment, and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic
Strategy 14 June 1996, (1996), http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/policy/growth.html.
20 S. Roberts, Understanding the Effects of Trade Policy Reform: The Case of South Africa 68 No.4
THE S. AFR. J. OF ECON . 607, 609-10 (2000).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 611.
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statistical studies, comparing performance before and after trade policy
reform, small or insignificant advantages. 3 To this finding should be
added the real danger that attributing all changes in economic
performance occurring during the material time, ignores the real
possibility that other variables, antecedent or exterior to the reform
paradigm, might be at work. Evidence from case studies suggests that
reduction in anti-export bias can be achieved more through export
incentives building on production capabilities than from import
liberalization. 4 Roberts concludes that export growth is more likely to be
due to investment and infrastructure measures or other forms of export
promotion than liberalization.25
However, the haste with which SADC Member States appear to
have embraced the WTO trade liberalization agreements of 1994, even in
breach of their own regional intra-trade economic arrangements,
demonstrates either an immense belief in the economic virtues of market
liberalization, or a definite abandonment of all hope against a system that
has evolved to subdue them beyond their wildest imagination. In 1994,
the Republic of South Africa-the SADC's largest and strongest national
economy-adopted a trade liberalization program agreed to under the
GATT and implemented under the WTO. In taking this inter-trade
highroad, the Republic of South Africa sacrificed some of its
fundamental intra-trade covenants with SADC Member States in that it
radically simplified, reduced or in some cases abolished tariffs for almost
all of South Africa's imports.26 The agreement also abolished stringent
requirements of the treaty establishing the SADC.27 For example, it
abolished the local content requirements referred to in article 5(1)(f),
which in itself undermines article 5(1)(e) of the SADC treaty which
requires Member States in their international relations to complement
regional strategies and programs. South Africa is not alone on this assault
of the object and purpose of the treaty establishing the SADC. Other
SADC Member States have or are signing up to multilateral agreements
with the WTO that threaten the objectives of the organization. The
remark that if nations' successes were measured by the number of
agreements that they had merely entered into with one another,
regardless of whether or not they actually carried them through, then
African nations would be the most successful individually, and
collectively. This ceases to be a conference joke, but a sad fact. To
safeguard their own commitments under the treaty establishing the
SADC, perhaps Member States should now start to negotiate as a single
23 Id. at 612.
24 Id. at 613.
25 Id. at 612.
26 Id. at 609.
27 See Treaty Establishing the Southern Africa Development Community supra note 3, at 116.
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entity those multilateral negotiations whose content is proscribed for by
their constituent treaty.
The case of the European Union's (EU) deletion of the Republic
of South Africa from its list of typically less developed countries entitled
to privileged trading arrangements under the Lom6 Convention
illustrates, the vulnerability to frustration of developing countries' efforts
to set up structures that have the potential to give them a fighting chance
against the dominant States in international trade. This is important
particularly because the EU is the SADC's largest and single most
important trade partner. 8 Following that deletion, South Africa, which
was keen to resume full trading relations with the EU after the election of
the government of national unity in 1994, was compelled to negotiate
with the EU separate trade agreements in spite of its membership to the
SADC group, which countries were entitled to preferential trade rules
under the Lom6 Convention. The negotiations, which started in March
1996, were duly concluded on October 11, 1999 in Pretoria, with the
signing by the two parties of the Agreement on Trade, Development and
Cooperation between the European Community (a supranational
organization 29) and the Republic of South Africa (a Member State of the
SADC). This development has alienated South Africa further away from
its SADC treaty pledges and left other Member States of the SADC to
develop their own trading arrangements with the European Union. Even
more, it raises questions about whether the treaty establishing the SADC
has started to fall apart. Article 42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT) (1969), recognizes that a Party may in certain limited
circumstances denounce or withdraw from a treaty, or the operation of a
treaty may for a time be suspended, or the treaty may terminate only as a
result of the application of the provisions of the treaty in question or of
the Vienna Convention.30 While South Africa may not have formally
withdrawn from or terminated its SADC membership, its trade
liberalization agreement with the EU appears to oppose the object and
purpose of the treaty establishing the SADC. This is contrary to Article
58 of the VCLT, which while recognizing under international law the
right of States upon giving notice to the other parties, temporarily and
inter se to suspend the operation of provisions of a treaty, insists that that
could happen only where the particular treaty allows for that; or if the
suspension in question is not prohibited by the treaty, or if it does not
affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty
28 See generally Akinkugbe 0. (2000) supra note 13.
29 See Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, Belg.-Den.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Greece-Ir.-Italy-Lux.-
Neth. -Port.-Spain-U.K., 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992). See also Antti Maunu, The Implied External
Competence of the European Community After the ECJ Opinion 1/94-Towards Coherence or
Diversity? 22 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 115, 115 (1995).
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 42, 8 I.L.M. 679, 695 (1969).
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or the performance of their obligations, and if it is not incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty. 31 The object and purpose of the
SADC treaty is to harmonize States Parties' economic policies and to
pursue complementarity between national and regional strategies and
programs leading to the formation of a full economic union,32 which is
exactly what the South Africa-EU trade liberalization treaty of 1999
opposes. This raises the question whether the SADC's constituent treaty
authorizes unilateral withdrawal or termination. The customary rule
pacta sunt servanda is instructive. Oppenheim writes that:
With treaties which are apparently intended, or expressly
concluded, for a permanent purpose or for a fixed period of time, it
would not be permissible to impute to the parties an intention to
allow unilateral denunciation or withdrawal. Apart from cases in
which such intention must be excluded, the position in customary
international law is less clear ... Article 56 of the Vienna
Convention lays down that the general rule is that in the absence of
provision in the treaty, a party may not withdraw from it or
denounce it: but denunciation or withdrawal are permitted on at
least 12 months' notice if it is established that the Parties intended
to admit that possibility, or if a right of denunciation or withdrawal
may be implied by the nature of the treaty.33
Qualitatively, the SADC treaty appears to be supranational in its
aspirations. That Parties intended unilateral withdrawal or denunciation
of the treaty is difficult to support, though in theory no treaty is beyond
Member States' competence to rescind. President Bush's announcement
on May 2, 2001 that his administration intended to leave behind the
constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972) because it
perpetuated distrust and mutual vulnerability, and to deploy defenses
against possible missile attacks from States, other than those formerly
regarded as major threats to the United States, is a good example. The
ABM Treaty is a bilateral treaty entered into in 1972 between the United
States and the then-Soviet Union. 4 Under the treaty, each Party
undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of
its country, not to provide a base for such defense, and not to deploy
ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for
in Article III, which allows each party to deploy one ABM system to
defend its national capital and one system to defend a region containing
31 Id. at art. 58.
32 See articles 5(l)(e) and 5(1)(f) Treaty Establishing the Southern Africa Development Community
supra note 3, at 124.
33 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1298-99 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., Longman
1996) 1905.
34 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, art. 1(2), U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acie/treaties/abm/abm.htm.
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ICBM silo launchers.35 The U.S.'s proposed missile defenses would go
beyond the limited systems permitted under the ABM Treaty. Analysis
of the U.S.'s claims that it unilaterally can free itself from the ABM
treaty is instructive on the question whether South Africa's breach of the
object and purpose of the SADC treaty is justifiable. Kirgis writes, that:
The parties to a bilateral treaty may agree, if they wish, to abrogate
or modify the treaty at any time. Thus, if the United States and
Russia agree that the ABM Treaty no longer serves their purposes
and decide to terminate it, they may do so by mutual agreement.
Non-party States would not have a right to object unless they could
make the highly unlikely showing that they were intended
beneficiaries of the Treaty, that they relied on the Treaty's
continuation in force (in the sense that they did or refrained from
doing something significant that they otherwise would or would not
have done), and that they would suffer material detriment if the
Treaty is terminated. If one of the parties to a treaty unilaterally
abandons it, the other party could maintain that the treaty has been
breached-unless one of the internationally-recognized grounds
for lawful treaty termination is present. One such ground, often
invoked when a party wishes to terminate a treaty obligation, is that
there has been a fundamental change of circumstances since the
treaty was entered into (sometimes called the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus). Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which codifies the customary international law of treaties for the
most part, a change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, but only if certain
conditions are met. First, the change must be of circumstances
existing at the time the treaty was made. Second, the change of
circumstances must be "fundamental." Third, the change must not
have been foreseen by the parties. Fourth, the existence of those
circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty in the first place.
Fifth, the effect of the change must be radically to transform the
"extent" of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. The
Vienna Convention does not define "fundamental" nor does it make
clear what is meant by the "extent" of obligations still to be
performed. Regarding the latter point, in the French language
version of the Vienna Convention, the word translated into English
as "extent" is "port~e." It could be translated as "impact." 
36
The EU's refusal to deal with South Africa as a typical
developing State would constitute a fundamental change of South
35 Id. at art. 3.
36 Frederic L. Kirgis, Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty, AM.SOC'Y. OF INT'L L.
(2001), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70.htm (last visited Oct. 1,2001). See also
Oppenheim's Int'l. L. supra note 33, at 1298.
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Africa's circumstance relative to the treaty establishing the SADC. The
reason for this is that the shift in the perceived status of South Africa by
the EU, and the effect of the shift on South Africa satisfies the criteria for
determining that a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred,
which entitles a State to walk away from a previous treaty dealing with
related subject matter. However, a Party is not entitled simply to declare
that because the change of circumstances rendered the treaty's
obligations unbearable it could no longer consider itself bound by the
treaty. Rather, "The proper course was considered to be for it first to
approach the other Party (or Parties) with a request to agree to the
abrogation of the treaty, perhaps coupling the request with an offer to
submit any disputed issue to judicial determination."37 This recognizes
that a treaty is concluded against the background of all kinds of
circumstances, which a State takes into account in consenting to be
bound by the treaty.
The perceived change of South Africa's economic status in the
eyes of its major trading partner, the EU, from being a typical developing
country that is entitled under the Lom6 Convention to a preferential trade
regime, to being much more than a typical developing country and
therefore not entitled to the preferential trade regime of the Lom6
Convention, probably justifies South Africa's breach of its commitments
under the SADC treaty on the grounds of foreseeability. Nonetheless,
given the fundamental nature of the treaty establishing the SADC, South
Africa could have resisted strongly the EU's effort to alienate it from its
geographical, political and economic base. In the alternative, it could
have initiated termination of its membership of the SADC. Given that
neither of the above options prevailed, the result is that firstly, the EU
has demonstrated its ability to bite out the heart of an emergent regional
trading bloc38 by compelling the most significant Member State of that
trading bloc to independently sacrifice its pledges to the emerging
regional enterprise by entering into free trade agreements with itself. A
second result is that the future of the SADC community hangs in the
balance. Subtraction from the SADC's economic weight of South Africa
means a certain and significant weakening of the SADC's economic
bargaining strength with the EU. Having engaged South Africa through
separate trade agreements, the EU has created for itself the possibility of
sidelining the SADC States whose economies are predicated on the
South African economy. This may compel the remaining SADC States to
deal with South Africa as the EU's broker in the region. Common
business sense has never favored third parties where there are two
principals. The smaller economies of the SADC will probably be the
37 See OPPENHEIM'S INT'L. L. supra note 33, at 1304-05.
38 South Africa contributes 60 per cent of the total SADC trade with the rest of the world. See
Valentine & Krasnik, supra note 15, at 275.
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biggest losers of the trade liberalization agreement between South Africa
and the EU. The European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of
People (Eurostep), a network of NGOs, in its response to the
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: Guidelines
for the Negotiation of New Cooperation Agreements with the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries of November 1997, correctly
expressed the concern that:
While liberalization has created significant winners, all studies
show that the weakest economies often lose, and the poorest and
most vulnerable people are those who usually absorb the majority of
the costs of adjustment. While the EU's proposed cooperation with
ACP to address supply-side constraints would assist in reducing
costs, this section on trade appears to ignore the impact on the poor.
39
No preferential treatment of individual SADC Member States by
the EU could mitigate the frustration of a fledgling supranational
organization intended to serve its own region. While the other Member
States of the SADC still enjoy preferential market access over South
Africa under the beef and veal, banana, and sugar protocols annexed to
the Lom6 Convention,4 ° that will probably change when South Africa's
agreements with the EU have been fully phased in accordance with the
1999 trade liberalization treaty between the two Parties. The SADC's
combined competitive advantage will probably be wiped out. The reason
for this forecast is that the access terms of South Africa to the EU market
will improve, and in fact become equal in some cases to those hitherto
enjoyed by remaining SADC Member States on a number of product
lines. One consequence of this development is that most of the SADC
Member States will begin to encounter intensified competition from the
much more developed markets in South Africa in terms of their exports
to the EU market. Increased South African exports may thus replace part
of SADC Member States' current exports to the EU.41 Economists apply
comparative advantage to determine the composition and direction of
trade.42 Comparative advantage theory states that under autarkic
conditions a country could potentially export those goods and services
39 See Eurostep, An Eurostep Response to the Communication to the Council and the European
Parliament: Guidelines for the Negotiation of New Cooperation Agreements With the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (1997), available at http://www.oneworld.org/eurostep/eccom.htm.
(Discussing the impact on exercise of national policy discretion of economic globalisation in South
Africa). See CALITZ supra note 16, at 564-05.
40 See Paul Sutton, Seminar on Small Island Developing States: Their Vulnerability, Their Program
of Action for Sustainable Development, Their Opportunities for Post-Lomb, Brussels, (1998),
available at http:www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/en/events/98013/sutton.htm.
41 Akinkugbe, 0. (2000), supra note 13, at 654-58.
42 Discussing the SADC's revealed comparative advantage ratios, see supra note 15, at 266.
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which it produces at lower costs, relative to other countries.43 According
to Balassa, if the share of exports of a specific commodity from a country
relative to total world trade in that commodity were higher than the share
of its total exports in world trade, then the exporter had a comparative
advantage in the export of that commodity.44 Research up to 2000 shows
that the export sectors showing the highest comparative advantage for the
SADC include a cross section of agricultural, mining and manufacturing
sectors. "However, even the manufacturing sectors that were identified
were largely agricultural or mineral based, e.g. pulp and waste paper,
iron and steel. "Given the size of the South African economy (reflected
by its share of SADC exports of about 60 per cent) one would expect the
relative comparative advantage to be heavily influenced by it."
4
Research on probable country specific implications of full
implementation of the Agreement on Trade, Development and
Cooperation between the European Community and the Republic of
South Africa (1999) suggests that: 1) Namibia will encounter increased
competition with South Africa with respect to fish products; 2)
Mauritius' textile industry will significantly be altered; 3) Swaziland's
competitive position might be altered in respect of pineapples and fruit
juice; and 4) Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe might face increased
competition with South Africa in tobacco and cut flowers and buds. 46
It appears that the EU's strategy of entering separate trade liberalisation
agreements with the SADC's most powerful Member State potentially
rips apart the sub-region's aspirations of achieving economic autonomy
by 2034. Established at the behest of sovereign independent States in
order to promote their joint common interests, the WTO could do more
to ensure that economic strategies adopted by States Parties:
1) do not foster economic dependence of developing States on their
more developed counterparts. Such an effort would be consistent
with the pursuit of international social justice47 or what
Gallagher calls the WTO's concept of balance and fairness; and
2) do more to promote economic, social and cultural rights
envisioned in the U.N. International Convention on Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966).48
43 Id.
44 See supra note 15, at 267.
45 See supra note 15, at 275.
46 See supra note 13, at 657.
47 The preamble to the Constitution of the ILO opens: "Whereas universal and lasting peace can be
established only if it is based upon social justice ... " International Labour Organisation Const.,
Preamble, http://132.236. 108.39:8050/publicenglish/about/iloconst.htn.
48 See G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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Otherwise developing countries' two-thirds numerical majority49 in the
WTO on the one hand, and the WTO's claim to instituting balance and
fairness in international economic life on the other will count for nothing.
Numerical strength on its own is of no significance in international
relations unless that majority includes the more powerful States who
perceive national interest in a particular position.
Conclusion
It appears that strategies applied by the EU in relation to SADC
potentially compel SADC economies to cope but not to compete with the
EU. This begs the question whether the WTO's mission of facilitating
market liberalization will reduce or add to international problems of
poverty, third world debt and corruption. The psychology and dynamics
of coping, evidence subservience and not mutual competitiveness. The
WTO may do well to consider introducing both substantive and
procedural mechanisms to counter further entrenchment of the
coping/dominance dynamic in international trade. Prohibition against
fragmenting of emergent supranational organizations intended to
enhance economic autonomy and competitiveness of developing States
through agreements with individual members of those emergent
supranational organizations is a possible first substantive step that the
WTO could make. To achieve this the WTO could use the ministerial
forum to scrutinize compliance with that prohibition by drawing
attention to agreements that have the potential to frustrate developing
countries aspirations to economic autonomy.
49 Numerical strength in international organisations often counts for nothing. Real power lays with
the common interest of the more powerful States. Progressive numerical majority of developing
States, that coincided with decolonisation after WW II, prompted a reversal of the fortunes of the
UN Security Council, which had seen a strengthening of the decision making capacity of UNGA
before decolonisation, perhaps to avoid the sting of Russian and Chinese vetoes where the other five
permanent member States of the Council preferred a particular outcome.
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